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This Note explores whether state and local legislation passed during the anti-apartheid 
divestment campaign can serve as a model for trustees of public pension funds to divest 
their holdings in fossil fuels consistent with their fiduciary duties of loyalty and 
prudence. The primary case to emerge from the anti-apartheid divestment campaign, 
Board of Trustees of the Employees Retirement System of the City of Baltimore v. 
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City gives some (albeit insufficient) guidance as 
to whether divestment by trustees of public pension plans of investments in fossil fuels 
would be a breach of their fiduciary duties. While the duty of loyalty allows for 
consideration of moral and ethical factors under certain circumstances, the duty of 
prudence more strictly requires that investors make no sacrifice in plan performance in 
favor of other considerations. However, the Baltimore analysis does not answer the 
question of whether it is consistent with the fiduciary duties of trustees to consider the 
risk that investments in fossil fuel companies will become “stranded assets” or that 
stigmatization will likely affect the share value of fossil fuel companies. This Note 
concludes that as the risks of climate change become clearer, fiduciary duties do not 
prohibit divestment. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of California Hastings College of the Law; L.L.M. 
Candidate, 2015, University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies; B.A., Middlebury 
College. Deep gratitude is due to Professor David Takacs for his mentorship in guiding this Note and 
to Professor William Wang for his insights. Many thanks also to the Hastings Law Journal Notes 
Team, Staff Editors, and Executive Board for their tireless and thoughtful contributions. 
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Introduction 
In 2012, 350.org, a nonprofit environmental organization, launched 
a campaign entitled “Fossil Free” that encourages investors to divest 
their holdings in the top 200 publically traded fossil fuel companies.1 The 
organization argues that fossil fuel companies are the major drivers of 
climate change; the earth faces extraordinary harm from climate change; 
shareholders benefit from the success of fossil fuel companies, and 
therefore benefit from climate change; and such profit is unethical.2 The 
campaign’s goal is to “force the hand” of fossil fuel companies to leave 
fossil fuels underground and to transform their businesses to significantly 
reduce emissions.3 The campaign also aims to pressure governments to 
enact legislation, such as drilling bans or carbon taxes.4 Campaigners 
 
 1. Atif Ansar et al., Stranded Assets and the Fossil Fuel Divestment Campaign: What 
Does Divestment Mean for the Valuation of Fossil Fuel Assets? 19 (2013) available at 
http://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/research/stranded-assets/SAP-divestment-report-final.pdf. 
 2. Frequently Asked Questions, Fossil Free, http://gofossilfree.org/frequently-asked-questions/ 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
 3. Ansar et al., supra note 1, at 9. 
 4. Id. 
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seek commitments from colleges and universities, cities and states, 
religious institutions, and foundations to divest from fossil fuel 
companies, signaling public disapproval for business as usual.5 The 
movement has gathered considerable support from cities, educational 
institutions, and religious entities since 2012.6 
Divestment campaigns have targeted issues as various as tobacco, 
nuclear power, firearms, genocide in Sudan, apartheid in South Africa, 
and now, the fossil fuels industry.7 There are many arguments against 
targeted divestment from fossil fuel companies. These arguments include 
concerns that: (1) divestment from such a large component of the U.S. 
economy may be considered a breach of fiduciary duties; (2) the industry 
is not easily replaced in investment portfolios; (3) divestment eliminates 
the possibility of encouraging fossil fuel companies to change their 
practices; and (4) making such substantial changes to an investment 
portfolio is too costly.8 All of these reasons warrant thorough 
investigation, but this Note examines whether divestment would breach 
pension plan managers’ duties of loyalty and prudence. 
Solving climate change requires action from all quarters. In the face 
of national and international inaction, the divestment campaign could 
prove one of many tools to bring about a solution. As was the case 
during the anti-apartheid campaign, divestment supporters do not 
believe the movement will put fossil fuel companies out of business.9 
Indeed, this is an unsupportable position. The relatively small 
depressions in share value that would result from public pension fund 
divestment will not have a permanent effect on fossil fuel companies’ 
bottom line in the short term. Neutral investors will recognize the 
opportunity to buy up shares if they believe a company’s actual value 
remains unaffected.10 Furthermore, the full host of divestible assets that 
the campaign targets is a very small pool of capital within a very large 
industry. However, divestment can result in stigmatization of target 
companies and encourage progressive legislation. Fund managers can use 
the media attention drawn by divestment to signal intolerance for 
business as usual and sway public opinion towards a more aggressive 
 
 5. Divestments Commitments, Fossil Free, http://gofossilfree.org/commitments (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2015). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Ansar et al., supra note 1, at 40 tbl.3 (reviewing past divestment campaigns). 
 8. Craig Metrick & Jane Ambachtsheer, Doing the Homework on Fossil Fuel Divestment, Pensions & 
Investments (May 8, 2013, 10:12 AM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20130508/REG/130509918/doing-the-
homework-on-fossil-fuel-divestment. 
 9. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 2 (“Divestment isn’t primarily an economic strategy, 
but a moral and political one. At the same time, there are certain economic impacts. Our institutions 
have enormous amounts of money and getting it out of coal, oil and gas, will create uncertainty about 
the viability of the fossil fuel industry’s business model.”). 
 10. See Ansar et al., supra note 1, at 30. 
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approach to addressing climate change.11 An example of bad media 
attention spurring corporate change is Exxon’s reaction to bad press 
after the 1989 Valdez oil spill.12 Shareholders responded to 
stigmatization by forcing the company to add an environmentalist to the 
board, opening the door for more socially responsible policies.13 
Divestment campaigns generally develop in three phases.14 In the 
first phase, religious groups and industry-related public organizations 
begin to take action. In the apartheid context, as early as 1980, the 
Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches pledged to divest $250 million 
from banks with ties to South Africa.15 The second phase ushers in 
universities, cities, and select public institutions.16 University divestment, 
public pension divestment, and the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act came during this phase.17 The final phase comes when the 
wider market recognizes the risk of continued investment in the 
offending assets.18 The fossil fuel divestment campaign is currently in the 
second phase.19 
This Note does not seek to judge the wisdom of divestment—there 
are strong arguments disputing its efficacy as a tool of social change. For 
example, some public pension funds, such as the California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”), actively manage their 
portfolios, vote their proxies, and work to influence company behavior.20 
CalPERS believes this is the most effective strategy for changing 
company behavior.21 Rather, this Note specifically examines the 
argument that trustees of public pension funds may breach their fiduciary 
duties of loyalty and prudence if they divest their beneficiaries’ assets 
from fossil fuel companies. This Note asks whether the legal framework 
for the anti-apartheid divestment campaign in the 1980s is a fitting model 
for divestment from fossil fuels. This Note concludes that though 
divestment from fossil fuels may not mirror the anti-apartheid 
divestment model, it does not create a breach of fiduciary duties for 
public pension plan trustees.22 
 
 11. See id. at 72. 
 12. Id. at 65. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 10. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 11. 
 20. See generally CalPERS, Towards Sustainable Investment: Taking Responsibility (2012), 
available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/press/news/invest-corp/esg-report-2012.pdf 
(demonstrating CalPERs commitment to and progress toward sustainable investments). 
 21. Madison Marriage, U.S. Pension Funds Keep Fossil Fuels Burning, Fin. Times, July 7, 2014, at 1. 
 22. The choice of public pension plan managers as subjects for this Note is deliberate. David Hess 
argues that public pension plans are well suited to be “surrogate regulators” given that they lack the 
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Part I of this Note explains the historical framework for the anti-
apartheid divestment campaign. In Part II, this Note outlines the legal 
framework for the anti-apartheid divestment campaign, including a 
discussion of the case Board of Trustees of the Employees Retirement 
System of the City of Baltimore v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore 
City (“Baltimore”). Part III introduces the climate change divestment 
campaign, and applies the duties of loyalty and prudence to fossil fuel 
divestment. In Part IV, this Note argues that the duty of loyalty is 
unlikely to pose a challenge to trustees, but the duty of prudence may 
give trustees pause. The analysis of the duty of prudence introduces 
evidence that fossil fuel-free funds perform similarly to other funds and 
explains the risks of “stranded assets” and stigmatization. This Part then 
briefly entertains the idea that the duty of prudence might require 
divestment from fossil fuel companies. Part V brings up another legal 
consideration from Baltimore. Finally, Part VI suggests areas of further 
exploration. 
I.  The Anti-Apartheid Divestment Campaign:  
Historical Framework 
In the 1980s, activists used a divestment campaign to influence the 
United States’ response to apartheid in South Africa.23 Under the 
apartheid regime, black South Africans, comprising approximately 
seventy-two percent of South Africa’s population in 1984, were subject to 
a system of institutionalized racism.24 Black South Africans were unable 
to change their circumstances because they were all but precluded from 
participation in the government and lacked political allies and formal 
organization.25 In 1985, the system of apartheid was entrenched. Those in 
the powerful minority of white South Africans benefited from the status 
quo.26 For white South Africans, an end to apartheid heralded higher 
taxes, less political power, marketplace competition, and the possibility 
of “cultural dilution.”27 Many in the global community held the opinion 
 
conflict of interest that corporate pension plan managers face; they are committed not only to current, 
but also future public employees; and their portfolios usually mirror that of the investment market as a 
whole. David Hess, Public Pensions and the Promise of Shareholder Activism for the Next Frontier of 
Corporate Governance: Sustainable Economic Development, 2 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 221, 235 (2007).  
 23. This discussion of apartheid in South Africa is based on writing contemporary to the 
apartheid divestment movement and represents the perspectives of writers at the time. This is an 
incomplete picture of the complex history and politics of apartheid. 
 24. Christine Walsh, The Constitutionality of State and Local Governments’ Response to 
Apartheid: Divestment Legislation, 13 Fordham Urb. L.J. 763, 764 n.4, 764–68 (1985). 
 25. Id. at 767. 
 26. Jonathan Leape et al., Introduction, in Business in the Shadow of Apartheid: U.S. Firms 
in South Africa ix, xiii (1985). 
 27. Id. 
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that change would have to come from outside the country.28 As anti-
apartheid sentiment grew in the United States, groups frustrated with 
The U.S. government’s inaction sought to influence policy through 
divestment of assets associated with companies doing business in South 
Africa. 
The campaign to divest from companies doing business in South 
Africa began on college campuses and took some time to grow. As of 
January 1980, Harvard President Derek Bok had rejected divestiture 
proposals in favor of shareholder activism.29 In several states, attorneys 
general issued opinions cautioning that trustees of state institutions 
divesting on ideological grounds may breach their fiduciary duty of 
prudence.30 The arguments used then are similar to those advanced now 
in the fossil fuel context: divestment involves significant transactional 
costs that result in a loss to pension plans, and there are better ways to 
influence businesses.31 However, by the end of 1989, twenty-five states, 
nineteen counties, and eighty-three cities in the United States had passed 
some sort of binding legislation against firms doing business in South 
Africa.32 
Several factors led to divestment during apartheid. The first was a 
moral one. The fundamentally racist foundation of the apartheid regime 
struck close to home for Americans. Activists viewed the American 
capacity to tolerate racial oppression abroad as a barometer for how 
black interests in the Unites States were weighted against the interests of 
the country as a whole.33 Furthermore, the United States profited 
economically from its business engagement with South Africa. Those 
profits were indivisible from, and were often the direct product of, the 
exploitation of black laborers.34 For example, in 1982, the United States 
owned twenty-five percent of the South African gold industry while 
black miners suffered terrible working conditions.35 The United States 
was also interested in the continued use of South Africa’s geopolitical 
position.36 
 
 28. Walsh, supra note 24, at 768. 
 29. Ben Bradlee, Apartheid and the Dollar—The Divestiture Dilemma: Should Colleges Use 
Stock Portfolios to Influence South Africa?, Bos. Globe, Jan. 27, 1980, at 1. 
 30. Id. The fiduciary duty of prudence is also referred to as the duty of care. This Note will use 
the term “prudence” except in direct quotations. 
 31. See Randy Furst, Impact of State’s Divestiture Policy Disputed, Minneapolis Star & Trib., 
Jul. 22, 1986, at 7A. 
 32. Richard Knight, Sanctions, Disinvestment, and U.S. Corporations in South Africa, in Sanctioning 
Apartheid 67, 69 (Robert E. Edgar ed., 1990). 
 33. Leape et al., supra note 26, at xi. 
 34. Id. at xxvi. 
 35. Id. at xii. 
 36. Id. 
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Second, there were also political arguments for ending apartheid. In 
introducing a 1985 collection of essays regarding business during 
apartheid, Jonathan Leape, Bo Baskin, and Stefan Underhill stated:  
Unless the West effectively communicates its political principles and 
makes clear its fundamental opposition to apartheid, anti-Western and 
anticapitalist sentiment will surely grow not only in South Africa but 
throughout the continent: What better example could communist 
propaganda find to illustrate the alleged decadence and oppression of 
the Western capitalist system?37 
Finally, the United States involved itself in ending apartheid 
because it was in a better position to influence South Africa than other 
countries. At the time, the United States was less able to exert 
ideological influence over other regimes all over the world. In contrast to 
Iran, Libya, or North Korea, the culturally similar white South African 
regime was simply more susceptible to American influence.38 
Though many agree that the anti-apartheid campaign had little, if 
any, impact on the financial markets, it is generally undisputed that the 
campaign had a social impact.39 The most tangible outcome was 
legislation. Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 
1986 over President Regan’s veto.40 In relevant part, the Act prohibited 
further U.S. investment in South Africa.41 It banned sales to the South 
African police and the military, and it banned new loans except for those 
made for the purpose of trade.42 The Act’s sanctions were not to be lifted 
until South Africa freed Nelson Mandela, demonstrated significant 
progress toward dismantling apartheid, and took at least three of four 
actions—ending the formal sequestration of black South Africans, 
freeing political prisoners, granting political freedom to all South 
Africans, and negotiating a settlement with representatives from the 
black majority.43 The actual implementation of the Act was at best, 
inadequate44 and at worst, insincere.45 However, for the purposes of this 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See, e.g., Ansar et al., supra note 1, at 64 tbl.5 (finding that although direct economic 
impacts of the divestment campaign were slight, and perhaps even counterproductive, increased global 
public awareness “deeply undermined the diplomatic standing of the apartheid regime”); Siew Hong 
Teoh et al., The Effect of Socially Activist Investment Policies on the Financial Markets: Evidence 
from the South African Boycott, 72 J. Bus. 35, 83 (1999) (concluding that, at most, the anti-apartheid 
divestment campaign “may have been effective in raising the public moral standards of public 
awareness” but had very little impact on financial markets). 
 40. Knight, supra note 32, at 69. 
 41. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 310, 316, 100 Stat. 1086, 
1102, 1104 (repealed 1993). 
 42. Id. §§ 304(1)–(2), 305. 
 43. Id. § 311(a)–(b). 
 44. Gay MacDougall, Implementation of the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, in Sanctioning 
Apartheid, supra note 32, at 19, 22–23. 
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Note, it is sufficient to note that in the face of significant political 
resistance, the anti-apartheid movement resulted in comprehensive 
legislation. 
II.  The Anti-Apartheid Divestment Campaign: Legal Framework 
As is currently occurring in the fossil fuel divestment campaign, plan 
managers during the apartheid divestment campaign resisted being told 
to divest. This Part describes the legal framework for requiring plan 
managers to divest through anti-apartheid divestment legislation. The 
Part begins with a discussion of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and 
prudence. Then, the Part provides some examples of anti-apartheid 
divestment legislation. Finally, the Part introduces the primary case to 
emerge from challenges to divestment legislation. 
A. Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty and Prudence 
In 1985, much like today, trustees of pension funds were required to 
comply with the duties of loyalty and prudence.46 The Uniform Prudent 
Investor Act of 1994 (“UPIA”) describes the modern duties of loyalty 
and prudence.47 Individual state law governs the duty a public pension 
plan trustee owes her beneficiaries.48 By way of example, the fiduciary 
duties of public pension plan managers in California are set forth in the 
California Constitution.49 In many cases, these duties mirror those of the 
UPIA, though some states have adopted their own clarifying laws to 
expand or contract the trustees’ discretion to base investment decisions 
on factors other than plan performance.50 For private funds, fiduciary 
duties are outlined in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (“ERISA”).51 ERISA was the model for many states’ public 
fiduciary duties during the apartheid divestment campaign.52 
 
 45. David Hirschmann, The Impact of Sanctions and Divestment on Black South African 
Attitudes Toward the United States, in Sanctioning Apartheid, supra note 32, at 91, 105. 
 46. Thomas A. Troyer et al., Divestment of South Africa Investments: The Legal Implications for 
Foundations, Other Charitable Institutions, and Pension Funds, 74 Geo. L.J. 127, 147 (1985). 
 47. See Trust Examination Manual: Appendix C—Fiduciary Law: Uniform Prudent Investor Act, 
FDIC, 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/trustmanual/appendix_c/appendix_c.html#_toc497113667 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2015); see also Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 90(a)–(c) (2007) (introducing the 
prudent investor rule); Unif. Prudent Mgmt. of Institutional Funds Act § 3 (2006) [hereinafter 
UPMIFA] (outlining fiduciary duties for charitable institutions). These standards are discussed further in 
their application to fossil fuel divestment. 
 48. Troyer et al., supra note 46, at 156–57. 
 49. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. XVI, § 17. 
 50. Hess, supra note 22, at 247–48. 
 51. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2014); Troyer et al., supra note 46, at 154. 
 52. See Troyer et al., supra note 46, at 155. 
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UPIA’s duty of loyalty states, “[a] trustee shall invest and manage 
the trust assets solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.”53 Likewise, 
ERISA’s duty of loyalty is that “a fiduciary shall discharge [her] duties 
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing financial benefits 
to participants and their beneficiaries.”54 Thomas Troyer, Walter 
Slocombe, and Robert Boisture, writing about the apartheid divestment 
movement in 1985, stated that under the fiduciary duty of loyalty, “no 
social good can justify imposing an increased investment risk or a 
reduced investment return on the beneficiaries of the fund.”55 On its 
face, the duty of loyalty does not per se prohibit social or moral factors 
from entering into the investment calculus, but it does require that such 
considerations not have a negative impact on plan performance.56 
Fiduciaries must also exercise a duty of prudence.57 Under ERISA, 
this means exercising the “care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity 
and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise 
of a like character and with like aims.”58 Similarly, under the UPIA, the 
duty is to “invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would, by 
considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other 
circumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall 
exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution.”59 This duty also requires 
considering the whole portfolio rather than single assets, balancing risk 
and return, and considering a wide array of factors, including general 
economic conditions, rather than taking a narrow view of investment 
decisions.60 
B. State and Local Legislation 
State and local legislatures, concerned that traditional trust law 
constrained pension plan managers from divesting their holdings in 
companies doing business in South Africa, enacted laws prohibiting or 
restricting the investment of public funds in firms doing business in South 
Africa.61 During the anti-apartheid campaign, in many cases, divestment 
came from such legislation rather than pension plan managers 
 
 53. Unif. Prudent Investor Act § 5 (1994) [hereinafter UPIA]. 
 54. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i). 
 55. Troyer et al., supra note 46, at 155. 
 56. Id.; UPMIFA § 3 cmt. (2006). 
 57. Troyer et al., supra note 46, at 155. 
 58. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2013); see also Troyer et al., supra note 46, at 155. 
 59. UPIA § 2(a) (1994). 
 60. Id. § 2 cmt.  
 61. Troyer et al., supra note 46, at 157. 
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themselves.62 If anti-apartheid divestment legislation was deemed legal 
under the state constitution, such legislation was a complete defense to 
challenges brought against managers of public pension funds on fiduciary 
duties grounds.63 
Some cities and states placed conditions on pension plan managers’ 
investment decisions. For example, Connecticut required corporate 
pension plan managers to do the following to retain or attract public 
funds: (1) “adhere to the Sullivan Principles,” a list of business practices 
that supported equality and fairness in the workplace, and quality of life 
improvements for nonwhites, such as better “housing, transportation, 
school, recreation, and health facilities”;64 (2) refrain from supplying 
“strategic products or services to the South African government, 
military, or police”; and (3) recognize the rights of South African 
workers to strike.65 Other states withdrew public funds entirely. For 
example, Massachusetts withdrew the entirety of its public pension funds 
from financial institutions with outstanding loans to the South African 
government and all corporations doing business in South Africa.66 
C. The BALTIMORE Case 
The primary case to emerge in the anti-apartheid divestment 
context was a pension plan trustees’ challenge to two Baltimore city 
ordinances. The ordinances required city pension plan trustees to divest 
their holdings from firms doing business in South Africa.67 Adopted in 
July of 1983, the Baltimore ordinances addressed holdings in the city’s 
three public retirement plans.68 They “provide[d] that no funds . . . shall 
remain invested in, or in the future be invested in, banks or financial 
institutions that make loans to South Africa or Namibia or companies 
‘doing business in or with’ those countries.”69 
With respect to the fiduciary duties of the trustees, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals considered two arguments from the challenging 
trustees. The first was that the ordinances improperly mandated that the 
trustees consider social factors where their duty of loyalty required 
consideration of the fund’s beneficiaries alone.70 The trustees argued that 
the Baltimore ordinances required them to act in the interest of parties 
 
 62. See id. at 157 n.111 (collecting examples of anti-apartheid legislation). 
 63. Id. at 157. 
 64. The Sullivan Principles, Marshall Univ., http://www.marshall.edu/revleonsullivan/principles.htm 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
 65. Walsh, supra note 24, at 774. 
 66. Id. at 774–75. 
 67. Bd. of Trs. v. Mayor of Balt. City, 562 A.2d 720, 723 (Md. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990). 
 68. Id. at 724. 
 69. Id. (citation omitted). 
 70. Id. at 736. 
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other than the beneficiaries, thereby violating the duty of loyalty.71 In 
dismissing this argument, the court found that consistent with their duty 
of loyalty, trustees could conclude that considering the ethical 
implications of the fund’s investment would properly serve the 
beneficiaries’ interests and effectively secure the provision of benefits in 
the future.72 
Second, the trustees argued that the ordinances altered the 
common-law duty of prudence that pension plan managers owed to their 
beneficiaries by prohibiting certain investments rather than permitting 
independent decisionmaking.73 In dismissing this argument, the court 
agreed with the trial judge’s finding that although the ordinances 
prevented the trustees from investing in some of the market’s largest 
firms, they did not prohibit construction of “an almost perfectly 
diversified portfolio, one that accurately matches the market as a whole” 
with smaller, South Africa-free firms.74 
The court further found that a number of safeguards prevented 
divestment from being inconsistent with the duty of prudence. These 
safeguards were a two-year phasing in of the transition to a South Africa-
free portfolio, the power of fiduciaries to suspend the program, and 
permission to make new investments in otherwise impermissible 
companies while the program was suspended.75 In the court’s 
interpretation, then, limitations on the ordinance prevented it from 
violating the trustees’ duty of prudence.76 The court also advanced a 
public policy argument, that “given the vast power that pension trust 
funds exert in American society, it would be unwise to bar trustees from 
considering the social consequences of investment decisions in any case 
in which it would cost even a penny more to do so.”77 Thus, Maryland’s 
highest court found that legislation requiring public pension plan 
managers to divest from firms doing business in South Africa would not 
require pension plan managers to violate their fiduciary duties.78 Though 
Baltimore is of little precedential value outside of Maryland, the case sets 
out a framework for analyzing whether divestment legislation or 
independent decisions by pension plan managers to divest from fossil 
fuel companies would violate the duties of loyalty or prudence. 
 
 71. Id. at 738. 
 72. Id. at 738. 
 73. Id. at 734. 
 74. Id. at 735. 
 75. Id. at 724–25, 736. 
 76. Id. at 736. 
 77. Id. at 737. 
 78. Id. 
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III.  Climate Change and the Fossil Fuel Divestment Campaign 
As explained above, the fossil fuel divestment campaign targets 
climate change. This Part first discusses why we must address climate 
change and then introduces the fossil fuel divestment campaign. 
A. Why Solve Climate Change? 
In the Dallas Morning News, an apartheid divestment challenger, 
contending that the human condition was much worse in countries less 
accessible to the media, stated, “[I]t sounds good politically for American 
politicians to say, ‘I’m against apartheid.’”79 Today, fighting against 
climate change is politically risky. Though this is changing, climate 
change denial is a prerequisite for political hopefuls in some circles.80 For 
example, Bob Inglis, a conservative Republican and former congressman 
from South Carolina, may have lost his seat in Congress for expressing 
his belief in anthropogenic climate change.81 
However, like apartheid, climate change presents serious human rights 
challenges. These challenges are global. The 2014 Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) report presents evidence that 
changing patterns of precipitation and snowmelt have affected water 
quality and quantity worldwide.82 The report describes a waning food 
supply in a time of increasing food demand due to rising populations and 
an increased ability to purchase food worldwide.83 This will lead to 
higher food prices that will hurt the world’s poorest first.84 Indeed, 
climate change-induced heat waves have already impacted food 
production and driven up costs in some places.85 Agricultural yields of 
maize and wheat have decreased.86 There is increased risk to people and 
ecosystems from extreme weather events, especially for those living in 
poverty.87 Urban areas are more vulnerable to heat stress and harm to 
 
 79. Doug J. Swanson, Apartheid Issue Reborn: Recent Awareness Spawns Rallies, Debates 
Across U.S., Dall. Morning News, Nov. 2, 1985, at 1a. 
 80. See generally Coral Davenport, The Coming GOP Civil War Over Climate Change, Nat’l J. 
(May 9, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-coming-gop-civil-war-over-climate-change-
20130509. 
 81. Jennifer Ludden, New Groups Make a Conservative Argument on Climate Change, NPR (Sept. 26, 
2012), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/09/26/161824667/new-groups-argue-a-conservative-take-
on-climate-change. 
 82. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Summary for 
Policymakers: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II 6 
(Christopher B. Field et al. eds., 2014), available at http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/ 
WG2AR5_ SPM_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter IPCC Summary for Policymakers]. 
 83. Justin Gillis, Climate Change Seen Posing Risk to Food Supplies, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 2013, at 
A1. 
 84. IPCC Summary for Policymakers, supra note 82, at 6. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 5. 
 87. Id. at 6. 
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people and infrastructure from extreme weather events.88 Small islands face 
loss of livelihood, economic instability, and threats to low-lying coastal 
areas.89 
North America is expected to face drying, flooding, intense weather-
related events, shifting patterns of agricultural viability, and intense, 
localized heat waves.90 Latin America will likely experience flooding, 
landslides, decreased food production, spread of vector-borne diseases, 
and water and food insecurity.91 Europe will likely experience economic 
loss due to increased flooding and rising sea levels, and witness intense 
heat and drought in the arid south.92 Asia, already strained in many areas 
by rapid urbanization and industrialization, will likely experience flooding, 
increased drought, malnutrition, and damage to infrastructure.93 Australia 
and New Zealand will likely lose agricultural vitality in some regions, 
experience biodiversity loss, and see increased coastal erosion and 
flooding.94 Finally, Africa will likely experience drought, reduced cereal 
crop production, threat to food security, and changes in the distribution 
of vector- and water-borne diseases.95 By the end of the twenty-first 
century, flood hazards will likely increase across over half the globe and 
droughts are expected to be more frequent and longer in dryer areas.96  
The report also notes that people who are already socially, 
economically, politically, culturally, institutionally, or otherwise 
marginalized are at a heightened risk for experiencing the effects of 
climate change.97 Like apartheid, climate change presents grave human 
costs. Unlike apartheid, the physical effects of climate change, though 
distributed disproportionately, will be experienced worldwide. Addressing 
climate change, even if only to protect the world’s poorest and most 
vulnerable populations, is a moral imperative. 
The reasons advanced for United States involvement in challenging 
apartheid also apply to climate change, in addition to the physical effects 
of climate change on the United States. Like profiting from poor labor 
conditions and low wages in South Africa, American companies and 
their investors have long profited from inexpensive greenhouse gas 
 
 88. Id. at 18. 
 89. Id. at 24 tbl.1. 
 90. Id. at 23 tbl.1. 
 91. Id. at 24 tbl.1. 
 92. Id. at 22 tbl.1. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 23 tbl.1. 
 95. Id. at 21 tbl.1. 
 96. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects: Contribution of Working 
Group II 247 (Jimenéz Cisneros et al. eds., 2014), available at http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/ 
images/uploads/WGIIAR5-Chap3_FINAL.pdf. 
 97. IPCC Summary for Policymakers, supra note 82, at 6. 
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emissions. There is also a political argument for taking action to solve 
climate change. As explained in this Note, many parts of the developing 
world will experience severe effects of climate change. This could cause 
the sort of political turmoil, weakened governance, and demographic 
shifts that strengthen violent non-state groups.98 In sum, it is both 
contradictory and unwise for the United States to decline to take a 
leading role against climate change where the reasons for doing so are 
similar to those advanced when the United States acted against apartheid. 
B. The Fossil Fuel Divestment Campaign 
As of mid-September 2014, twenty-eight U.S. cities have committed 
to divesting from fossil fuels.99 Most of the city resolutions “urge,” 
“request,” or “recommend” that their pension fund managers consider a 
path towards divestment. As one of many examples, on October 21, 
2013, Ann Arbor, Michigan “urged” pension fund managers to 
reconsider their investments in fossil fuels.100 Providence, Rhode Island, 
a coastal city uniquely situated to feel the effects of climate change, also 
“requested” divestment.101 The Providence divestment resolution 
“request[s] that the Board of Investment Commissioners ensure that 
within five years none of its . . . assets include holdings in fossil fuel 
public equities and corporate bonds as determined by the Carbon 
Tracker list.”102 Though this signals solidarity with the divestment 
movement, the city of Providence (not to be confused with the Rhode 
Island Public Pension System) is not a public pension plan fiduciary. San 
Francisco, another vulnerable city, is among the twenty-eight to have 
made a commitment to fossil fuel divestment.103 However, despite the 
San Francisco Board of Supervisors’ commitment, San Francisco’s 
 
 98. See Joshua W. Busby, Council on Foreign Relations, Climate Change and National 
Security: An Agenda for Action 9 (2007), available at http://www.cfr.org/climate-change/climate-
change-national-security/p14862. 
 99. Divestment Commitments, supra note 5. 
 100. Ann Arbor OKs Fossil Fuel Divestment, Ann Arbor Chron. (Oct. 22, 2013, 1:00 AM), 
http://annarborchronicle.com/2013/10/22/ann-arbor-oks-fossil-fuel-divestment. 
 101. See Alex Kuffner, Experts: Climate Change Leaves Rhode Island, Region Vulnerable to 
Severe Storms, Providence J. (Sept. 20, 2013, 11:15 PM), http://www.providencejournal.com/breaking-
news/ 
content/20130920-experts-climate-change-leaves-rhode-island-region-vulnerable-to-severe-storms.ece. 
 102. Resolution of the City Council, City of Providence (June 20, 2013), available at 
http://350ma.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Providence-RI_resolution-enacted_6-20-2013.pdf. 
 103. Aaron Sankin, San Francisco Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement Takes Its First Steps Against 
Big Oil, Huffington Post (Apr. 25, 2013, 8:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/25/san-
francisco-fossil-fuel-divestment_n_3158012.html. 
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Employees’ Retirement System Board has refused to take action.104 The 
board cited a preference for “slow[ing] down,” and voted instead to 
analyze its proxy voting policy.105 
As these examples show, the movement is gaining traction and 
recognition. A bill that was proposed in the Massachusetts Legislature 
would have made Massachusetts the first to divest from fossil fuel 
companies. Interestingly, Massachusetts was the first state to divest 
during the apartheid divestment movement.106 The fossil fuel divestment 
bill called for: (1) the identification of fossil fuel companies; (2) a 
divestment scheme ratcheting up to complete divestment of public funds 
from publically traded securities in fossil fuel companies within five years 
of enactment; (3) a prohibition against the acquisition of new fossil fuel 
assets; and (4) an exception for indirect holdings in actively managed 
investment funds, provided that the trustees submit a letter to the 
managers of the fund requesting that they remove fossil fuel companies 
from the investment fund, or alternatively, to create another fund devoid 
of the fossil fuel companies and to reinvest the Massachusetts assets in 
the new fund.107 Like the Baltimore ordinances upheld in Baltimore, the 
Massachusetts proposal included a clause that allowed the public fund to 
cease divestment as necessary if the total value of the Public Fund drops 
in value by more than 0.5 due to the initiative.108 The legislature did not 
take action on the bill.109 
On average, public pension plans in the United States and United 
Kingdom hold only two to five percent of their assets in fossil fuel 
companies.110 However, divestiture is a weighty decision for fiduciaries 
and may explain why certain cities have failed to take action. Public 
pension plan managers may cite their fiduciary duties as a reason not to 
divest or otherwise incorporate social responsibility into their investment 
decisions.111 For example, CalPERS states that its fiduciary duties of 
loyalty and prudence, as defined by the California Constitution, 
“generally forbid CalPERS from sacrificing investment performance for 
 
 104. Joshua Sabatini, SF Board Decides Not to Divest Pension Money from Fossil Fuel 
Companies, S.F. Examiner (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/sf-board-decides-
not-to-divest-pension-money-from-fossil-fuel-companies/Content?oid=2602319. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Shira Schoenberg, Pension Politics: The History of Divestment in Massachusetts, MassLive 
(May 8, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/05/the_history_of_divestment_ 
in_m.html. 
 107. S. 1225, 188th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Mass. 2013). 
 108. Id. § 5. 
 109. Shira Schoenberg, Fossil Fuel Divestment Bill Fails to Pass in Massachusetts Legislature, 
MassLive (Aug. 1, 2014, 9:45 AM), http://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/08/fossil_fuel_ 
divestment_bill_fa.html. 
 110. Ansar et al., supra note 1, at 11. 
 111. See Hess, supra note 22, at 247. 
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the purpose of achieving goals that do not directly relate to CalPERS 
operations and benefits.”112 Pension plan managers may also challenge 
divestment legislation as inconsistent with their fiduciary duties. 
IV.  Under the BALTIMORE Framework, May Public Pension Plans 
Divest from Fossil Fuel Companies? 
Using Baltimore and the UPIA as a framework, this Part assesses 
whether pension plan managers can divest from fossil fuels consistent 
with their duties of loyalty and prudence. Because there is evidence that 
fossil fuel-free portfolios perform similarly to other portfolios, plan 
managers may divest from fossil fuels without breaching their duty of 
loyalty. Those performance outcomes, the risk that fossil fuels will 
become stranded assets, and the risk that fossil fuel companies will 
become stigmatized are all factors properly considered in deciding to 
divest consistent with the duty of prudence. 
A. Duty of Loyalty 
Under the Baltimore framework, localities that choose to divest 
their public pension plan holdings are unlikely to face successful legal 
challenges based on their duty of loyalty. Again, UPIA’s duty of loyalty 
states, “[a] trustee shall invest and manage the trust assets solely in the 
interest of the beneficiaries.”113 On its face, administering a plan to 
alleviate the suffering of those living under apartheid or affected by 
climate change is not “solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.” 
However, fiduciaries do not necessarily violate their duty of loyalty by 
considering the social impact of their investment decisions. So long as the 
costs of those considerations are de minimis, a pension plan manager is 
not likely to breach her duty of loyalty.114 The court in Baltimore 
reached this conclusion by finding that investing in “businesses with ‘a 
proper sense of social obligation’” will serve the long-term interests of 
plan beneficiaries.115 Thus, under the UPIA and Baltimore frameworks, 
the duty of loyalty permits divestment if: (1) plan managers believe that 
it will help then invest in “companies with a proper sense of social 
obligation”; and (2) divestment does not have more than a de minimis 
impact on plan performance. 
First, judging whether top fossil fuel companies have a “proper 
sense of social obligation” is beyond the scope of this Note. However, 
 
 112. CalPERS, California Public Employees’ Retirement System Statement of Investment 
Policy Regarding Divestment 2 (May 29, 2014), available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eipdocs/ 
investments/policies/invo-risk-mang/divestment.pdf. 
 113. UPIA § 5 (1994). 
 114. Bd. of Trs. v. Mayor of Balt. City, 562 A.2d 720, 738 (Md. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990). 
 115. Id. (citation omitted). 
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given the risks of climate change, divestment from fossil fuel companies 
would certainly not prohibit plan managers from investing in companies 
with a “proper sense of social obligation.” Second, divestment from fossil 
fuel companies for the benefit of those living in regions vulnerable to 
climate change will likely have no more than a de minimis impact on the 
performance of pension plans. Studies demonstrate that fossil-free 
portfolios closely track the performance of the major stock indices. For 
example, the Aperio Group, an investment management firm, produced 
a report on how two different portfolios (coal-free and fossil fuel-free) 
would perform compared to an average portfolio.116 For comparison, 
they used the funds’ tracking error, or, their deviation from a trusted 
index of stock performance, such as the Russell 3000.117 Deviation could 
indicate either better or poorer performance. Passively managed 
investments are expected to closely track the market indices, meaning 
that they have a tracking error close to zero percent.118 Actively managed 
pension funds bear an average tracking error of five percent.119 
The report finds that excluding fifteen of the most harmful coal 
companies from an otherwise optimized portfolio returns a minute 
deviation from the Russell 3000 benchmark, meaning that plan managers 
could have been almost completely passive in their investment 
management and achieved the same results.120 Next, the report found 
that a portfolio excluding all oil, gas, and consumable fuels returned a 
tracking error of 0.60.121 This means that portfolios excluding fossil fuels 
track the market indices more closely than those actively managed by 
plan administrators. The Aperio Group concluded that although there 
are financial arguments for both advocates and skeptics of divestment, 
the difference in performance is minimal.122 The fact that there is 
tracking error implicit in fossil fuel-free portfolios demonstrates some 
risk. A second analysis uses the difference in returns between the Russell 
3000 and a hypothetical fossil-free fund to measure the historical tracking 
error. The analysis shows that the fossil-free fund delivered slightly 
better returns over the past twenty-five years, but that historical tracking 
error is slightly higher than the predictive model at 0.78.123 On the other 
hand, the difference in performance is minute, much smaller even than 
the risk of allowing a professional investment manager to actively 
 
 116. See generally Patrick Geddes, Aperio Grp., Do The Investment Math: Building a Carbon-
Free Portfolio (2013), available at http://www.aperiogroup.com/system/files/documents/building_ 
a_carbon_free_portfolio.pdf. 
 117. Id. at 2. 
 118. Id. at 3. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 4. 
 122. Id. at 6. 
 123. Id. at 5. 
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manage funds.124 This sort of negligible volatility is similar to that 
predicted under the Baltimore ordinances, which were found not to 
breach the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Another investment support firm, 
MSCI, conducted a study that showed similarly minute deviations from 
market performance for fossil fuel-free funds.125 Because fossil fuel-free 
portfolios perform similarly to portfolios that include fossil fuel 
companies, divestment does not breach the fiduciary duty of loyalty, 
even if undertaken for social benefit. 
B. Duty of Prudence 
The duty of prudence is a higher hurdle for trustees than the duty of 
loyalty. First, as stated above, the duty of prudence generally requires 
“invest[ing] and manag[ing] trust assets as a prudent investor would, by 
considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other 
circumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall 
exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution.”126 This duty may vary by 
state. For example, Section 17 of Article 16 of the California 
Constitution, states, in part: 
The members of the retirement board of a public pension or retirement 
system shall discharge their duties with respect to the system with the 
care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then 
prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar 
with these matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like 
character and with like aims. . . . The members of the retirement board 
of a public pension or retirement system shall diversify the investments 
of the system so as to minimize the risk of loss and to maximize the 
rate of return, unless under the circumstances it is clearly not prudent 
to do so.127 
In light of the modern “prudent investor rule,” set forth in the 
UPIA, analysis of the duty of prudence in the fossil fuel divestment 
context differs in some ways from the Maryland Court of Appeal’s 
analysis in Baltimore. For example, the court in Baltimore noted the 
importance of the trustees’ ability to construct a “perfectly diversified 
portfolio” that matched the makeup of the market at large. 
Diversification is the investment practice of holding multiple stocks 
whose performance is negatively correlated.128 Diversification reduces 
“diversifiable risk” by ensuring that as the value of one stock declines, 
the value of another will rise.129 The duty to diversify could present a 
 
 124. Id. at 6. 
 125. See MSCI, Responding to the Call for Fossil-Fuel Free Portfolios 4–8 (2013), available at 
http://www.msci.com/resources/factsheets/MSCI_ESG_Research_FAQ_on_Fossil-Free_Investing.pdf. 
 126. UPIA § 2 (1994). 
 127. Cal. Const. art. XVI, § 17(c)–(d). 
 128. UPIA § 3 cmt. 
 129. See id. 
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hurdle for plan managers wishing to divest from fossil fuels, or for state 
or local legislatures wishing to require divestment. Fossil fuel-related 
companies offer a distinct diversification benefit because they possess 
strong negative correlation to other sectors.130 However, this duty does 
not constitute a significant barrier. The UPIA does not specify what 
constitutes a diversified portfolio. Rather, the only explicit requirement 
of the duty to diversify is that trustees not retain a concentration in one 
particular asset.131 Indeed, “there is no automatic rule for identifying how 
much diversification is enough.”132 Studies have concluded that as few as 
ten to fifteen and as many as 150 stocks are required to properly 
diversify.133 Furthermore, the most beneficial sector for purposes of 
diversification is utilities,134 suggesting that reinvestment of fossil fuels in 
other forms of energy could provide an equal, if not better, 
diversification opportunity. Finally, the duty has an escape hatch. A plan 
manager need not diversify if, “the trustee reasonably determines that, 
because of special circumstances, the purposes of the trust are better 
served without diversifying.”135 By exercising prudence in minimizing 
diversifiable risk through other assets, a plan manager will not breach her 
duty to diversify. 
In addition, the Baltimore court based its decision in part on the 
availability of exceptions to divestment in case of poor plan 
performance.136 Indeed, the court noted that a divestment scheme may 
not cause more than a de minimis effect on the performance of a public 
pension fund.137 The court noted if “social investment yields 
economically competitive returns at a comparable level of risk, the 
investment should not be deemed imprudent.”138 Thus, “social” 
investments must yield returns at comparable risk to investments that do 
not consider social or moral concerns. The studies addressed above show 
that real and hypothetical fossil fuel-free funds perform similarly to the 
market as a whole. These studies provide sufficient support for the 
decision to divest in accordance with the duty of prudence. 
Even absent these results, there is evidence that the viability of the 
fossil fuel industry is questionable. The following Subparts present the 
risks that investment in fossil fuels pose to pension plans. These risks are 
 
 130. See Sector Correlation Matrix, AssetCorrelation, http://www.assetcorrelation.com/sectors 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
 131. Trent S. Kiziah, The Trustee’s Duty to Diversify: An Examination of the Developing Case 
Law, 36 ACTEC L.J. 357, 361 (2010). 
 132. UPIA § 3 cmt. 
 133. Kiziah, supra note 131, at 362–63. 
 134. See Sector Correlation Matrix, supra note 130. 
 135. See UPIA § 3. 
 136. Bd. of Trs. v. Mayor of Balt. City, 562 A.2d 720, 736 (Md. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990). 
 137. Id. at 737. 
 138. Id. 
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(1) that fossil fuels will become “stranded assets” and (2) that fossil fuel 
companies will become stigmatized as a result of the divestment 
campaign itself. These risks should indicate to trustees that they do not 
breach their fiduciary duty of prudence by divesting. Whether a trustee 
has fulfilled her duty of prudence concerns the trustee’s actions in 
investigating and evaluating an investment.139 Under the UPIA, each 
investment decision is evaluated as part of an entire portfolio, rather 
than as a single investment.140 Trustees who want to protect the decision 
to divest must develop and adhere to a well-documented investment plan 
that contains clear and convincing procedural safeguards.141 
1. The Risk of Stranded Assets 
Fossil fuels are at risk of becoming “stranded assets.” The Stranded 
Asset Program at the Smith School of Energy and the Environment at 
Oxford defines “stranded assets” as “environmentally unsustainable 
assets [that] suffer from unanticipated or premature write-offs, 
downward revaluations or are converted to liabilities.”142 In the fossil 
fuel context, this refers to investments in fossil fuels that will either never 
be extracted, or when they are, will be worth less than anticipated. 
Because the risk of assets becoming stranded is largely underappreciated, 
they are priced higher than their actual value, posing a risk to 
investors.143 
There are a number of commonly cited risks in the fossil fuel 
industry that may result in assets becoming stranded: (1) physical 
environmental challenges to resource-intensive industries, including the 
rising costs of new methods of extraction; (2) international greenhouse 
gas emissions regulation, extraction limits, or carbon taxes that may cap 
the amount of fossil fuel extracted; (3) the decreasing cost of competitive 
clean technology; (4) evolving social norms and consumer behavior that 
preference cleaner energy; and (5) the growing litigation risk faced by 
fossil fuel companies.144 
 
 139. See generally United States v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council of Greater N.Y., 909 F. Supp. 891 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that defendant trustees acted in delinquencies rather than mistake and had a 
duty to invest in a way that would earn compound interest). 
 140. UPIA § 2(b). 
 141. Troyer et al., supra note 46 , at 156. 
 142. Ansar et al., supra note 1, at 2. 
 143. Id. at 16. 
 144. Id. at 2. Plaintiffs have sued private corporations under theories such as negligence and 
nuisance. See generally Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012); Comer v. 
Murphy Oil U.S.A., 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009); Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co. Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 
314 (2d Cir. 2009); People v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007). A U.K. commentator suggested that in addition to encouraging divestment, pension plan 
beneficiaries should release a “barrage of lawsuits” against pension plan trustees for violating the right 
to life and subsistence of many millions worldwide by maintaining investments in, and therefore 
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Particularly worth noting here is the risk of regulation. Many 
scientists agree that to avoid the most catastrophic effects of climate 
change, the earth must not increase in mean temperature more than two 
degrees.145 To remain short of this threshold, between sixty and eighty 
percent of the world’s current fossil fuel reserves must remain 
unconsumed.146 Meaningful legislation to meet this goal could reduce the 
value of fossil fuels by requiring that most of the reserves that comprise 
the fossil fuel industry’s value remain in the ground. Legislation affecting 
share price could come in the form of carbon taxation, restrictions on the 
net permitted amount of fossil fuel extracted, renewable energy portfolio 
standards, or non-fossil fuel energy subsidies.147 Any one or combination 
of these regulations could cause a devaluation of the entire industry, and 
therefore pose a risk to share value and pension plan performance for 
those plans that remain invested. Without widespread international 
cooperation, a drilling ban is unlikely.148 The companies with the most 
significant fossil fuel reserves operate in other countries and would not 
be impacted by U.S. legislation.149 However, the United States is a large 
consumer of fossil fuels and a carbon tax, if enacted, would significantly 
depress demand.150 Renewable energy portfolio standards are a common 
feature of state and local law.151 
The Securities and Exchange Commission provided what should be 
a useful tool for pension plan managers trying to take a measured look at 
whether divestment from fossil fuel companies is prudent. In 2010, the 
SEC issued an interpretation of its disclosure rules as they relate to 
climate change.152 This interpretation suggests that the rules require 
disclosure of the material business impacts of the following: (1) pending 
legislation, regulation, or international accords; (2) possible consequences 
of developing market trends; (3) possible adverse reputational impacts; 
and (4) physical impact of climate change on productivity.153 If 
 
funding, fossil fuel companies. Assad W. Razzouk, A Barrage of Lawsuits Is Needed to Curb Climate 
Change, INDEP. (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/a-barrage-of-lawsuits-
is-needed-to-curb-climate-change-9274922.html. 
 145. Carbon Tracker Initiative, Unburnable Carbon 2013: Wasted Capital and Stranded 
Assets 3 (2013), available at http://carbontracker.live.kiln.it/Unburnable-Carbon-2-Web-Version.pdf. 
 146. Id. at 4. 
 147. Ansar et al., supra note 1, at 66. 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. at 67. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See, e.g., Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS), Cal. Energy Comm’n, 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
portfolio (last updated Sept. 16, 2014); Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. Energy 
Info. Admin. (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850. 
 152. See generally Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 
75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241). 
 153. Id. at 6295–97. 
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companies are in fact making the required disclosures, trustees have at 
their fingertips the information required to decide on behalf of their 
beneficiaries whether the assets they hold in fossil fuel companies are at 
risk of becoming stranded. However, a private study indicates that 
companies are not meaningfully reporting their climate change risk.154 
British Petroleum, for example, reports its belief that by 2035, oil, coal, 
and gas will make up eighty-one percent total of the global energy mix, 
down only five percent from 2012.155 They also predict a forty-one 
percent increase in energy consumption in that time period.156 This 
outlook presents a very different future than one that avoids the most 
devastating effects of climate change. To avoid these effects, global 
emissions would have to become negative starting in 2020.157 
2. The Risk of Stigmatization from the Divestment Campaign 
Itself 
The divestment campaign itself could pose a risk to share value and, 
consequently, to pension plans holding stocks in fossil fuel companies. 
This would not be due to a direct impact on fossil fuel companies’ 
bottom lines, but rather due to the indirect impact of stigmatization.158 A 
typical but erroneous understanding of divestment is that it causes the 
company from which investment is withdrawn financial hardship, which 
in turn causes the company to change its behavior.159 However, 
divestment is unlikely to have a direct effect on a fossil fuel company’s 
bottom line. As explained above, neutral investors will purchase the 
divested shares, which will hold the price stable.160 
However, the likelihood of an indirect impact caused by 
stigmatization does support divestment. Divestment skeptics focus on the 
fact that unlike declining to purchase a product, which depresses demand 
and, ultimately, the company’s share value, selling stocks does not 
depress value.161 That is true, “[u]nless the sale of stock conveys 
 
 154. Leon Kaye, Amazon, Apple Ignoring SEC Climate Change Risk Disclosure Rules, Triple 
Pundit (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.triplepundit.com/2013/09/amazon-apple-sec-climate-change-
disclosure-rules. 
155. British Petroleum, B.P. Energy Outlook 2035, at 17 (2014), available at http://www.bp.com/ 
en/global/corporate/about-bp/energy-economics/energy-outlook/outlook-to-2035.html.  
 156. Id. at 4. 
 157. Andrew Freedman, IPCC Report Contains “Grave” Carbon Budget Message, Climate Cent. 
(Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/ipcc-climate-change-report-contains-grave-carbon-
budget-message-16569. 
 158. Ansar et al., supra note 1, at 14. 
 159. See id. at 29. 
 160. See id. at 30; see also supra notes 1–22 and accompanying text. 
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information to the market about the future cash flows.”162 The Stranded 
Assets Program report finds that stigmatization due to the fossil fuel 
divestment campaign could convey such information.163 Stigma “evokes a 
collective perception from a social audience that a target organisation 
‘possesses a fundamental, deep-seated flaw that deindividuates and 
discredits the organisation.’”164 Stigmatization can scare “away suppliers, 
subcontractors, potential employees, and customers.”165 
Governments prefer to do business with firms perceived as 
responsible to avoid tainting their own reputation.166 Firms that 
experience stigmatization may be unable to compete for projects, be 
barred from permits or licenses, and have weakened bargaining power 
with other companies. For example, Ashland Oil Company sold its South 
African operations when, in mid-1986, it stood to lose a $12-million 
contract with the City of Los Angeles.167 Stigmatization can depress the 
value of stock by making the company appear risky, even where the 
actual value of the company remains unchanged.168 
Stigmatization can also foreshadow legislation. This is one of the 
most consistent results of divestment campaigns, and is a likely and 
desirable outcome of the fossil fuel divestment campaign.169 If the 
campaign spreads the belief that legislation restricting the extraction or 
use of fossil fuels (such as a drilling ban or a carbon tax) is imminent, it 
increases the uncertainty of the future profitability of fossil fuel 
companies.170 The threat of such legislation is sufficient to create 
uncertainty around future cash flows and provoke even morally 
uninterested investors to sell their shares.171 
Stigmatization is likely to be the most tangible effect on fossil fuel 
companies.172 Because people increasingly believe that doing nothing in 
the face of climate change is unethical and financially unwise, fossil fuel 
companies are beginning to experience negative stigmatization. Norway’s 
Storebrand, a large private pension and insurance firm, sold its shares of 
nineteen fossil fuel companies.173 The firm does not have an ethical 
mission; rather, they determined that investment in fossil fuels no longer 
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served the long-term financial goals of its clients.174 More recently, the 
heirs to the Rockefeller oil fortune cleared the Rockefeller Brothers 
Fund of its fossil fuel assets.175 Stanford University emptied its 
endowment of investments in coal.176 Financial institutions may begin to 
find fossil fuel stocks undesirable for purely economic reasons, in 
addition to moral reasons.177 
Adherents to the efficient market hypothesis would argue that all 
available knowledge about the risk that climate change poses to the 
viability of the fossil fuel industry (including stranded assets and 
stigmatization) is already reflected in fossil fuel share prices. However, 
since the 1987 Supreme Court decision that announced the presumption 
of an efficient market, Basic v. Levinson,178 the efficient market theory 
has been challenged as “a theory in search of objective proof.”179 
Moreover, recent calls for fossil fuel companies to disclose their climate 
change risk and carbon fuel holdings suggest mounting concern that 
information relevant to investors, while available through other media, is 
not part of regular disclosures and thus not reflected in investment 
decisions.180 
3. Changes in Market Norms and Debt Financing 
Explained below are two other possible, though unlikely, direct 
impacts that the fossil fuel divestment campaign may have on fossil fuel 
companies: changes in market norms and debt financing.181 
If the campaign signals a shift in market norms, a relatively small 
removal of assets could cause a lasting depression of share value. This is 
because money managers manage money uniformly according to market 
conventions to avoid the risk of accusations of mismanagement. 
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Demonstrating a herd mentality, money managers may act irrationally 
when it appears that their peer institutions are all following a pattern of 
behavior.182 A change in market norms could occur if divestment triggers 
a snowball effect, where influential investors begin to move capital away 
from fossil fuel companies, and it quickly becomes unacceptable for 
others not to follow suit.183 Studies show that divestment campaigns can 
result in shifts in market norms.184 This is unlikely to happen solely due 
to public pension fund divestment because the amount of capital that the 
divestment campaign targets is relatively small and unlikely to trigger 
such a snowball effect.185 However, divestment by institutions like 
Stanford and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund could signal a change in 
market norms. 
Furthermore, debt financing becomes less available when banks 
consider a venture too risky to be worth extending credit.186 This 
happened in South Africa during apartheid. U.S. banks denied loans to 
South Africa in response to uncertainty created by the divestment 
campaign.187 This is unlikely to happen with the fossil fuel industry. 
There are many sources of capital, and the industry’s high liquidity 
largely shields it from defaulting on debt.188 However, this may impact 
financing of riskier projects, such as those that are located in remote 
geographical locations or are politically contentious.189 Though there is a 
chance that the divestment campaign will cause a shift in market norms 
or debt financing, these impacts are unlikely and do not support 
divestment on those grounds. 
Because there is evidence that fossil fuel company stocks are at risk 
of stigmatization and of becoming “stranded assets,” pension plan 
managers divesting from fossil fuel companies do not breach their 
fiduciary duty of prudence. Indeed, pension plan managers who choose 
not to divest should take a close look at the risk fossil fuel assets pose to 
their portfolios. In light of the research presented above, pension plan 
managers who do not stay informed of these political and economic 
developments may find themselves in breach of their duty of prudence 
for failure to consider the extent of the risk of climate change. 
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V.  Another Legal Consideration: The Nondelegation Doctrine 
Proponents of divestment encourage removing assets from the 
“Carbon Tracker 200”, a list of the top 200 contributors to climate 
change.190 For example, a resolution in Providence, Rhode Island calls 
for divestment of “assets includ[ing] holdings in fossil fuel public equities 
and corporate bonds as determined by the Carbon Tracker list.”191 This 
is low-hanging fruit for those seeking to challenge legislation. The 
Maryland Court of Appeals considered whether the Baltimore 
Legislature had impermissibly delegated its lawmaking authority when it 
instructed pension fund directors to divest from the Africa Fund’s 
“Unified List of United States Companies with Investments or Loans in 
South Africa and Namibia.”192 The court noted that it would strictly 
scrutinize delegation to a private entity (as opposed to an agency) because 
such entities are “wholly unaccountable to the general public.”193 
Also troubling to the court was the fact that the Baltimore 
ordinances did not merely accept a fixed list of companies promulgated 
by the Africa Fund; rather, the ordinance directed trustees to refer to the 
most recent annual report.194 If the ordinance delegated to the Africa 
Fund the power to identify companies subject to divestment, reasoned 
the court, there would have been serious concerns about the validity of 
the ordinance.195 However, in a feat of constitutional avoidance, the 
Court of Appeals interpreted the language of the ordinance to require 
the pension plan managers to use the Unified List as “merely as an 
advisory reference.”196 Noting that the descriptor “‘doing business’ in a 
particular area” lends itself to multiple interpretations, the court 
proposed its own standard: doing “a ‘substantial amount of business’ or 
engaging ‘in significant business activity’ in that area.”197 In drafting 
divestment legislation, lawmakers should consider including methods for 
determining from which companies’ pension plan managers should be 
required to divest to avoid nondelegation challenges. 
VI.  Areas for Further Research 
This Note leaves open the question of whether divestment would 
actually achieve a desirable social outcome. The results of the anti-
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apartheid divestment campaign were decidedly mixed, and critics 
proposed many other actions that may have had a more direct and lasting 
impact on the well being of black South Africans. Likewise, there may be 
more desirable alternatives to divestment, such as shareholder 
engagement. Divestment also involves transactional and other costs, an 
economic consideration beyond the scope of this Note. 
Finally, this Note also leaves for another time the question of when 
liability for continued investment in fossil fuels will attach. Assuming 
that the economic predictions supporting this Note’s conclusion 
ultimately occur, the question arises: Are pension plan managers 
continuing to invest in fossil fuel companies currently in breach of their 
fiduciary duties? For the same reasons, fiduciary duties may ultimately 
require trustees to divest. As described above, there is evidence that 
current stock prices reflect the value of unburnable carbon reserves. 
Indeed, a recent IPCC report found that companies and governments 
worldwide have identified four times more fossil fuel in reserve than the 
earth can safely burn without experiencing the most drastic effects of 
climate change.198 When stock prices adjust, they will depress 
permanently, causing a loss to shareholders and beneficiaries. Evidence 
from past divestment campaigns shows that the campaign itself, through 
stigmatization of the fossil fuel industry and the ultimate achievement of 
industry regulation, could lead to decreased share value.199 However, 
because the duty of prudence requires measured decisionmaking, and 
not a specific outcome, this question warrants further exploration. 
Conclusion 
Though divestment from fossil fuels may be more financially 
complex than anti-apartheid divestment, it does not require pension plan 
managers to breach their fiduciary duties. Reversing climate change will 
take a global, cohesive effort that the U.S. government has so far 
resisted. However, as the strength of the fossil fuel divestment movement 
indicates, the public’s motivation for change could prove an alternative 
catalyst. Because fossil fuel-free portfolios perform similarly to other 
portfolios, divestment from fossil fuels does not breach a plan manager’s 
duty of loyalty, even if divestment is socially motivated. Furthermore, 
divestment does not require a breach of the duty of prudence. That fossil 
fuels are at risk of becoming stranded assets, and fossil fuel companies 
are at risk of being stigmatized, conveys valuable information about the 
future value of these stocks. Thus, divestment based on an evaluation of 
these risks is consistent with the duty of prudence. Consistent with their 
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fiduciary duties, public pension plan managers may divest from fossil fuel 
companies, whether motivated by economic considerations, moral duty, 
or to signal their commitment to reversing climate change. 
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